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Abstract - Since sensor nodes suffer from limited 
resources, in memory storage, computing power, energy 
capabilities, and transmission rates, available network 
security protocols are inadequate. Symmetric algorithms 
cannot provide the same degree of security as public-key 
algorithms, the fact of which has led us to devise a new 
algorithm, SHESP, which uses public keys within the 
limitations of sensor nodes. This paper aims to present a 
way to utilize existing public-key algorithms in the field of 
wireless sensor network security by dividing the network 
into clusters. Our algorithm supplies data confidentiality, 
node authentication and data integrity while remaining 
within acceptable memory, time and energy constraints. 
Also, an important feature we opted to establish, which was 
lacking in most security protocols, was enabling secure 
node-to-node communication, without the need to route 
through a distant base station. We provide theoretical as 
well as experimental evidence to validate our algorithm. 
Keywords: Sensor Networks, Energy Efficiency, Security 
Protocol, Public Keys, Clustering 
 
1 Introduction and Related Work 
Sensor nodes are deployed in harsh physical conditions, and 
are required to transmit sensitive data, so securing the data 
transmitted through WSNs is important to maintain the 
confidentiality of the data and authenticate the sensor nodes 
participating in the network. Most protocols opt to use 
symmetric cryptography, because it is less expensive than 
public key algorithms. It is possible to use a single global 
secret key that is shared by the base station and all the 
sensor nodes, but that becomes useless if a node is 
compromised by a malicious adversary, and the entire 
network can become vulnerable to attacks. In other 
scenarios, the base station shares a distinct pair-wise key 
with every sensor node in the network, but that requires a lot 
of overhead and usually does not scale well. Also, to enable 
node-to-node communication, nodes would have to resort to 
a pair-wise key sharing, which is not efficient since it 
requires the storage of (n-1) keys in each node in an n-node 
network, and the addition (or deletion) of nodes dynamically 
requires establishing (or removing) shared keys with all the 
nodes in the network. The main problem with using 
symmetric keys is their secure establishment between the 
nodes without being detected by an outside attacker, which 
would often require either pre-deployment actions to 
bootstrap the keys or the involvement of a base station to 
distribute the keys. Thus, symmetric algorithms cannot 
provide the same degree of security as public-key 
algorithms, the fact of which has led to a new trend in 
finding ways to use public keys within the limitations of 
sensor nodes. Our research aims to present a way to utilize 
existing public-key algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-
Hellmann, and Elliptic Curve in the field of wireless sensor 
network security. By dividing the nodes in the network into 
clusters, asymmetric encryption and decryption can be 
applied in the nodes chosen to be clusterheads. The use of 
asymmetric cryptography permits the establishment of 
symmetrically secure channels between nodes and their 
clusterheads, as well as allowing node-to-node 
communication within the network. Our algorithm provides 
confidentiality, node authentication, and data integrity while 
remaining within acceptable memory, time and energy 
constraints. Most existing protocols utilize the 
computational simplicity of symmetric algorithms to 
implement security in Wireless Sensor Networks. The most 
prominent algorithm is SPINS [1], which was developed at 
Berkeley; it uses RC5 for encryption and depends on two 
building blocks: SNEP, to provide data confidentiality 
through encryption, authentication with Message 
Authentication Codes (MAC) and freshness by use of 
counters, and µTESLA, for authenticated broadcast. 
However, such protocols require pre-deployed keys which 
affect scalability and node-to-node communication can only 
be achieved by going through the base station. Another 
protocol was built at Berkeley to be used on top of TinyOS 
called TinySec [2], which is based on implementing link-
layer security on the level of packets. This protocol provides 
a way for authenticating and encrypting packets, focusing 
on the use of an Initialization Vector to enhance the 
encryption technique, but does not put forth a new keying 
mechanism and instead implements security on a one-hop 
level. In the provided implementation, the researchers use a 
pre-deployed network-wide key. In terms of our research, 
this mechanism is not viable or efficient, and the level of 
security it can assure is questionable since the capture of a 
single node can break down the entire network.  
 Research attempts into utilizing public key 
cryptographic systems in wireless sensor networks began, 
and one suggested protocol to utilize public keys is built on 
top of TinySec under the name TinyPK [3]. It necessitates 
the presence of two entities other than the sensor nodes, a 
Certification Authority (CA) and an External Party (EP), 
having more powerful resources, and having a pair of 
public/private keys, while the CA’s public key is pre-
 
configured into the nodes. The EP signs its public key with 
the CA’s private key and sends it to the nodes, which can 
verify it and obtain the EP’s public key. Nodes can then 
generate a session key, encrypt it with the EP’s public key 
and share the session key with the EP, establishing 
symmetric security with the exchanged key. The issues with 
regard to this protocol is the need for two extra entities that 
have more functionalities to be able to maintain all the 
node’s keys and manage the public key system, as these 
entities are not always available in regular sensor networks. 
Also, the protocol does not appropriately handle 
compromised private keys and node-to-node communication 
also relies on the EP as a middle-man. The most recent work 
in wireless sensor network security is [4] which is able to 
provide a better level of security than TinySec with lower 
energy consumption. PIKE [5] employs the use of 
intermediary nodes as trusted sources to securely establish 
shared keys. As for [6], the authors provide a secure and 
energy-efficient way of performing data aggregation in 
sensor networks.  
 The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 
provides a detailed explanation of our algorithm, including 
our intended goals and design. The mathematical analysis of 
our protocol is in Section 3. Section 4 presents our 
simulation results and a comparison with the security 
protocol in TinyPK [3], and we conclude this paper in 
Section 5. 
2  Design and Framework 
 
 We start with a brief abstract idea of the algorithm 
before going into the details of every phase. The protocol 
identifies three types of possible entities participating in the 
network: a Base Station, clusterheads, and regular nodes. 
The Base Station is assumed to be secure against all kinds of 
attacks and has much more powerful resources than other 
nodes in the network, which is a valid assumption used in 
other references such as [4][6]. Clusterheads are identical in 
hardware formation to all other nodes in the network, but 
their selection process depends on them having the most 
capabilities at that time (Section III.C.4). Each node is 
identified by a 2-byte ID, stored in it prior to deployment, 
along with a 4-byte authenticator, which is stored in the 
Base Station as well, to allow integrity checking for 
nodes.For the cryptography aspect of the protocol, we 
summarize here the general algorithms used, whereas the 
detailed analysis involved with each mechanism is analyzed 
later.  As an overview, for symmetric operations, we 
adopted RC2, as it is fast and requires a 56-bit key only. As 
for encrypting or decrypting with the node’s authenticator, 
the authenticator is doubled into 8 bytes and used as the key 
within an implementation of the DES mechanism. For the 
asymmetric encryption/ decryption processes, we opted to 
use Elliptic Curve algorithms, as opposed to RSA, because 
analysis showed that it does faster computations and can use 
a smaller-size key (112 bits) [2][7]. As for integrity 
checking, we use a MAC-like checksum for every 
transmitted packet, which amounts to 4 bytes; the data that 
this checksum is applied to varies with each type of packet 
depending on the required validation. This type of MAC is 
chosen because it is capable of providing the needed data 
validation without large packet overhead or increased source 
code requirements. Note that keys in the whole protocol are 
generated only once, and used for all transmissions after 
that. However, the algorithm might decide that new keys 
must be generated because of the change in a clusterhead, 
for example.  
 
1- Establishing the Key between the Clusterhead and 
Nodes in the cluster: The agreed-upon fact is that public key 
algorithms are computationally expensive, and so energy-
draining; thus, not all nodes can be expected to perform such 
operations, which would lead to great energy requirements 
and the death of nodes in relatively short time. Therefore, 
the communication within clusters is done by way of 
symmetric keys, known to be secure and require fewer 
computations. The restrictions imposed by regular 
symmetric protocols are the initial establishment of secret 
keys between any two nodes in a secure manner, as well as 
the need to store several keys in a single node to enable its 
communication with other nodes. The algorithm in this 
phase aims to solve these issues. Initially, the Base Station 
has a pair of public/private keys, and assuming that the 
clusters are established in the network, it broadcasts its 
public key to all the clusterheads. Then, each clusterhead has 
to establish a set of keys with the member nodes of its 
cluster. For each node, the clusterhead generates a random 
secret key, includes its authenticator, its own ID, and the ID 
of the node it wishes to use this secret key with. All this data 
is encrypted with the Base Station’s public key, and if this 
key is not available in it, it can request the public key from 
the Base Station. The packet then is appended with the Base 
Station’s ID, to allow intermediate nodes to forward it, and 
the necessary MAC, computed over the symmetric key, the 
CH’s ID and authenticator, and the ID of the intended node 
(all data before encryption). The packet is broadcasted, since 
no routing protocol is in use here (even though a routing 
protocol can be added), and recipient nodes continue to 
broadcast until the packet reaches the Base Station. The 
Base Station then decrypts the data, using its private key, 
and computes the checksum to validate that the received data 
has not been tampered with. If the integrity check passes, the 
BS compares the received authenticator with the one listed 
with the sender’s ID in its list of nodes. If the authenticator 
does not match, the message is discarded, as the sender is 
assumed to be insecure. When the sender is assured to be 
reliable, the Base Station forms a packet consisting of the 
key, its ID, and the sending CH’s ID, encrypted with the 
receiving node’s authenticator, and appends the recipient 
node’s ID, also to allow the proper forwarding. A MAC is 
computed over this entire data and added to the packet. 
When the packet reaches the intended node, it decrypts it 
using its authenticator, and recognizes the ID of its 
 
clusterhead and the secret key that is to be used for all later 
communications with this clusterhead. Note that a node 
cannot communicate securely with other nodes unless the 
data is routed through the clusterhead; this will be further 
explained in a later section. By repeating these same steps 
for all the nodes declared to be members of a clusterhead’s 
group, secret symmetric keys will be established between the 
clusterhead and these nodes, and are maintained in the 
clusterhead. The node, on the other hand, only has to 
maintain this single key to enable its communication with its 
clusterhead. For this phase, both asymmetric and symmetric 
algorithms are used. The CH encrypts the generated key 
with the Base Station’s public key, and uses Elliptic Curve 
encryption on the data packet, whereas the Base Station 
decrypts using its private key and Elliptic Curve decryption. 
The generated key in the clusterhead is a symmetric key 
established by RC2 mechanism, which the clusterhead and 
the corresponding node can use for communication from that 
point on. As for the transmission of this key from the Base 
Station to the node, it is encrypted with the node’s 
authenticator, listed in the Base Station and in the node itself 
since deployment, providing a symmetric mechanism that 
the node can decrypt with. The authenticator is used as a 
symmetric key using the DES encryption/decryption 
algorithm, thereby allowing both the Base Station and the 
node to apply it for the needed cryptographic operations. 
2- Establishing Communication between Two 
Clusterheads: Clusterheads are the designated leaders in the 
disjoint groups within the network, so transmissions from 
and to the nodes in any cluster have to pass through the 
corresponding clusterheads. Thus, to enable secure 
communication between different clusters, we must enable 
secure communication between their clusterheads. For this 
case, symmetric keys cannot be used, because clusterheads 
are established dynamically, and may be rotated throughout 
the lifetime of the network. Because of the choice of 
clusterheads in the network, we allow these leaders to 
perform public key operations, not only with the Base 
Station (as in the first part of the protocol), but also with 
fellow clusterheads. Upon election, clusterheads generate a 
pair of public/private keys to use in the EC system, so when 
a clusterhead wishes to communicate with another, it 
requests the recipient’s public key, encrypts any data to be 
sent with it, and broadcasts it on route to the receiving 
clusterhead. This latter can asymmetrically decrypt the data, 
and in doing so can now capture secure data from another 
Clusterhead. 
3- Establishing Communication between Two Nodes: Now 
that the previous part enabled uncompromised exchange 
between clusterheads, this phase can explore the steps of 
putting forth a safe technique for node-to-node 
communication. For any two nodes Ni and Nj, wishing to 
share data, regardless of whether the two nodes are in the 
same cluster or not, the nodes have to transmit the data 
through their assigned clusterheads. First, Ni encrypts its 
message with the symmetric key it shares with the 
clusterhead (determined in 1st part); note that this operation 
is computationally simple and non-expensive for a regular 
node. Ni also encrypts its own ID and the ID of the recipient 
node, appends the clusterhead’s ID, and computes a MAC 
over the entire packet. It then sends the encrypted message 
to the clusterhead – say Ci – which checks to determine if 
the receiving node is part of this cluster or not. In case it is, 
the clusterhead must decrypt the message and re-encrypt it 
with the symmetric key appointed to the node that is to 
obtain this data. Otherwise, the clusterhead has to forward it 
to the leader of another group that contains the sought-after 
node. The sender side’s clusterhead decrypts the data 
symmetrically, then sends an initial message containing the 
recipient node’s ID. As in all broadcast transmissions, nodes 
continue to forward this message until it is stopped by a 
relevant node, which in this case is the clusterhead of the 
group including Nj. Once the remote clusterhead – call it Cj – 
detects that the message is meant for a node in its vicinity 
(from the list of nodes in its cluster), it sends back its public 
key to Ci, allowing them to communicate. Ci then encrypts 
the message from Ni with Cj’s public key and transmits it in 
the same way. When it is delivered to Cj , it decrypts it with 
its local private key, then encrypts it with the required node 
shared key and forwards the message to it, along with the 
initial sender’s ID. Naturally, Nj is now able to acquire the 
message by decrypting with its secret key. 
4- Clusterhead Hand-Off: Several existing clustering 
protocols - e.g. LEACH [7] - advise that clusterheads should 
be rotated to maintain the highest level of battery power 
possible. For our protocol, any clustering algorithm can be 
used, but our concern is maintaining the security even during 
the clusterhead rotation. In general, for a clusterhead to give 
over its responsibility to another node in its neighborhood, it 
has to deliver its shared keys to the newly-chosen node. 
However, to keep up the level of security, these shared keys 
cannot be continuously used by all clusterheads as that 
implies the exposure of the keys to several nodes in the 
neighborhood endangering confidentiality. So, for safe 
clusterhead rotation to take place, we propose that the 
resigning CH send its list of node shared keys to the newly-
chosen CH, encrypted with that CH’s public key (CHs are 
required to generate public/private key pairs as soon as they 
are elected). The new clusterhead can decrypt this list but it 
cannot use them for its communications; instead, it generates 
a new list of secret keys for the nodes in the cluster 
(including the old CH), and then delivers them to their 
corresponding nodes encrypted with the old shared keys. 
Thus, the keys established by the resigning CH are used 
once by the new CH, only to inform the nodes of the new 
shared keys. Upon reception of these messages, the nodes 
can remove the old keys and replace them with the new, for 
these will be the ones used for communication from that 
point on. As for the old CH, which does not have a previous 
symmetric key, the new CH can send it a generated shared 
 
key encrypted with its public key, so it performs an 
asymmetric operation to get its new symmetric key, and 
proceeds to behave as a regular node in the group. In this 
way, the clusterhead has been rotated to maximize energy 
usage, and the rotation was done locally without any 
interference from the Base Station. The flowchart of SHESP 
is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig 2. Flowchart of the protocol–entities between brackets are 
encrypted with the subscript mechanism 
 
 
3  Analysis of SHESP 
 
In this section, we go through the phases of the security 
protocol, presenting detailed analysis of the algorithms used 
and the induced expenses in terms of storage, computational 
overhead, time, and energy. Basically, our aim is to evaluate 
the energy required for each of the primary operations: send, 
receive, and compute. The energy overhead is rated (in 
Mica2 motes) at 1µJ for sending one bit, 0.5µJ for receiving 
one bit, and 5 nJ (0.005 µJ) for processing a single 
instruction [8]. We calculate the memory, time, and thereby 
energy needed for each of the basic operations described in 
the phases above. 
Analysis of the Storage Requirements 
Here, we evaluate what must be maintained in each node for 
use in the protocol, i.e. keys and information about other 
nodes in the network. The Base Station is the focus point of 
the network, and considering that it is capable of holding 
large amounts of information and has enough energy to 
maintain it for long periods of time, we’re not concerned 
with minimizing expenditures on the Base Station’s side. 
The Base Station saves the IDs of all the nodes in the 
network and their corresponding authenticators, but it is not 
required to store any keys related to the nodes, since it uses 
their authenticators as symmetric keys when it needs secure 
communication with them. So, for an n-node network, it will 
need to maintain (2+4) n bytes of IDs and authenticators (2-
byte IDs, 4-byte authenticators), in addition to its pair of 
public/private keys, which are 44 bytes each (88 bytes in 
ECC). The clusterhead is also required to maintain 
information about the nodes in its cluster, namely their IDs 
and the generated secret keys. The secret keys generated by 
RC2 are 56 bits long, so for a neighborhood of k nodes, each 
clusterhead has storage of (2+7) k bytes (2-byte IDs, 7-byte 
keys), in addition to its own ID, authenticator and 
public/private keys for a total of 94 bytes (2 + 4 + 88). As 
for the nodes, they are only requested to maintain their own 
IDs, authenticators, and shared key with their respective 
clusterheads, resulting in a total of 13 bytes (2 + 4 + 7) in 
each node. Obviously, the storage requirements are within 
reason and capabilities of the nodes, even in the case of 
clusterheads, because of the assumption that the number of 
neighbors in a single cluster is limited. 
 
Analysis of the Security Implications 
The algorithm as applied ensures data confidentiality, 
authenticity, and integrity as well as resilience to some 
attacks against the security of the network.  
1- Data Confidentiality: This metric is ensured through the 
keying mechanism used and the use of strong 
encryption algorithms. In the first phase, the symmetric 
key established between every node and its clusterhead 
cannot be detected. The packet transmitted from a 
clusterhead to the base station is encrypted with the base 
station’s public key and the only way to recover the 
packet is through the base station’s private key which is 
only maintained by the base station itself. The packet is 
then delivered from the base station to the node 
encrypted with the node’s authenticator, which is pre-
deployed and never transmitted across the network. As 
for the packet transmission from one clusterhead to 
another, it is also achieved with public-key 
cryptography using the receiving clusterhead’s public 
key. Also, for a clusterhead to communicate with a node 
in its own cluster, the established symmetric key is used 
to encrypt messages, and since the key was exchanged 
safely, then this too is a secure operation. Data 
confidentiality is also ensured through the use of strong 
encryption algorithms combining both symmetric and 
asymmetric key cryptography.  
2- Data Integrity: Our algorithm ensures data integrity. 
Data integrity means that data has not been tampered 
with. This is ensured through the use of message 
authentication codes (MAC). The receiver drops a 
packet if the MAC generated over the packet is different 
than the MAC appended to the message. We choose a 4-
byte MAC, which is proven to be robust against brute 
 
force attacks. With a 4-byte MAC, an attacker has to 
generate 232 packets in the worst case, if he is to attempt 
to pose as a secure node and send data with a forged 
MAC. On average, he needs to send 231 packets. It is 
important to realize that brute forcing a MAC cannot be 
done offline, since the only way to decide whether the 
brute force attack is successful is by sending the 
message to the node. With conventional networks, 
where the bandwidth can reach up to 1Mbps, this 
method is not a problem. However, with an average of 
19.2 kbps in a sensor network, sending 231 packets 
would require more than 20 months, a period during 
which battery-operated nodes would already be dead 
[2]. 
3- Data Authenticity: Data authenticity requires that the 
data come from a proper and secure source. An attacker 
who would want to fabricate its own message should 
fabricate its associated MAC as well. However, the 
attacker lacks the required MAC-generating function. 
Also, considering that the MAC is generated over the 
plain-text data (prior to encryption), the MAC function 
cannot be deduced from inspecting messages during 
transit, making the MAC forgery even more difficult. 
Messages with invalid MACs would thus be exposed 
and dropped. We already argued that brute-forcing a 
MAC is not feasible.  
4- Protection against Routing Attacks: A common attack 
is for the attacker to change the destination of a packet 
in transit or its source. We already encrypt the id of the 
source node, so having an attacker alter it is not 
possible. Though the id of the destination node is not 
encrypted, yet a MAC is applied to the whole packet 
including the id of the destination node. Thus, if an 
attacker alters this field, the receiver would not accept 
the packet since the regenerated MAC and the one 
appended would not match.  
5- Protection against Sybil Attacks: In a Sybil attack, an 
attacker sends messages with different virtual identities 
and locations, thus claiming to be multiple nodes. 
Without cryptographic authentication, a receiver of a 
message cannot determine the true identity of its 
originator, and does not know how many of the claimed 
identities are truly existent and unique [9]. Our 
algorithm is resilient to Sybil attacks only after the 
clusters have been formed, since each node would 
already know its clusterhead, the only node with which 
it communicates, and each clusterhead has a list of the 
nodes that belong to it. Still an attacker can pose itself 
as a neighbor node since the node ids are public. 
However, no packet is sent from a node without a form 
of authentication. Since the attacker is neither aware of 
the key to be used for encryption nor the authentication 
mechanism used, all packets it sends would be 
neglected. 
6- Protection against Selective Forwarding Attacks: An 
attacker can use compromised nodes to launch selective 
forwarding attacks, in which compromised intermediate 
nodes selectively drop data traffic passing through them 
and thus severely jeopardize data availability. Our 
approach adopts a one-to-many data forwarding 
approach through the use of broadcasting. Thus, if an 
attacker drops a packet by way of selective forwarding, 
this same packet would still reach its destination via 
other routes passing through non-compromised nodes. 
7- Analysis of the Mobility Implications: Our protocol 
continues to work as expected in case of mobility. The 
only effect mobility imposes on our algorithm is the 
changes introduced for the clustering. In case a node 
changes its position and moves out of range from its 
assigned clusterhead, it should inform its clusterhead 
(before moving) of its decision, and the clusterhead can 
accordingly remove its shared key from the list. 
Afterwards, the node must join another cluster. With an 
advertisement message, it can alert another clusterhead 
to its presence, and then the clusterhead can simply 
generate a new shared key for it and establish the 
symmetric connection via the Base Station. Another 
case occurs if the clusterhead becomes mobile, which 
should not happen often because of the mobility metric 
integrated into the clusterhead election process, and this 
is handled in the same manner with which the 
clusterhead handles the reduction in energy. The node 
with the most capabilities within the cluster is selected 
to be the new clusterhead and can generate new keys 
and distribute them securely to all member nodes using 
their old symmetric keys. The original clusterhead 
becomes a regular node and can join any other cluster. 
 
4  Simulation Results 
 
To evaluate the performance of our security protocol, we 
implemented SHESP in JProwler, a Java-based simulator 
intended for sensor networks. We created a network of 100 
nodes, divided into 10 clusters, and a base station, where 
each cluster contains a clusterhead and 9 non-clusterhead 
nodes. In our experiments, we simulate sending data 
between a source and a target node and study the effect of 
increasing the spatial separation between them on the 
incurred energy expenses and the end-to-end time delay. We 
assume only one sender transmitting a single data packet. 
The basic data message is 11 bytes long, and it is expanded 
into a packet of different sizes. We measure the energy 
consumed by the entire network till the data reaches the 
target node. In both graphs shown below, we do not 
consider the energy needed for the clusterheads to generate 
their public and private keys since this is done only once for 
every clusterhead. We consider five test cases. In the first 
case, the sending and receiving nodes belong to the same 
 
cluster. The remaining four have the nodes belonging to two 
different clusters with increasing spatial separation. The 
protocols used for comparison purposes are: (1) a network 
applying no security protocol, i.e. pure broadcasting, (2) a 
network applying the TinyPK security protocol [3].  
 The first no-security protocol helps in showing the 
overhead incurred purely from enabling 
encryption/decryption operations. The messages exchanged 
are exactly the same as those done in SHESP, so the 
forwarding overhead is similar except in packet sizes, which 
are also affected by cryptographic operations. As for 
TinyPK [3], we chose to compare this security protocol with 
ours since it also employs public-key operations to establish 
a symmetric secure channel between any node in the 
network and an external party (or a base station).  
 Fig. 2 displays the energy expenditure over all the 
nodes in the network relative to the spatial separation 
between the source and target nodes. The figure shows the 
variation in energy consumption between the different 
network setups. Our protocol induces a decrease in energy 
usage due to the optimized required cryptographic 
operations, so the witnessed decrease in energy relative to 
TinyPK will prolong the overall lifetime of the system. 
Compared to the non-security protocols, the minor increase 
in energy usage is expected due to the extra computational 
usage of encryption. We notice that the energy expenditure 
in SHESP over the entire network does not exceed 0.1J for a 
single data exchange. Considering that our network is made 
up of 100 nodes and each node has around 2.5J of energy as 
it starts out, then the network as a whole has 250J of 
available energy. If we were to measure the life expectancy 
of the sensor network based on these results, we can 
estimate that it can provide on the order of a thousand data 
exchanges, taking into consideration the energy needed to 
establish the clusters and the symmetric keys. Note that the 
energy results given are excluding those needed for 
establishing the public keys for the CHs and corresponding 
clusters, which is done once upon deployment. Fig. 3 shows 
the total time delay incurred between the sending of the 
message at the source node and its reception at the target 
node. The results show that the delay is comparable to that 
induced in the non-secure approach. The difference in the 
delay can be accounted to the time needed to perform the 
cryptographic operations. However, the difference is greater 
compared to TinyPK and that shows the strength of SHESP. 
To measure the maximum throughput when using SHESP, 
we computed the total number of packets that could be sent 
in a 60 second time period. In this experiment, we 
configured a network of nodes so that multiple nodes would 
simultaneously transmit as rapidly as possible. Since the 
number of senders affects the channel utilization, we varied 
the number of senders. This allows us to characterize the 
throughput at different regimes. We sent 11 bytes of 
application data using the SHESP, TinyPK, and with no 
security protocol. We measured the number of packets that 
were successfully received. The results are in Fig. 4. SHESP 
bandwidth characteristics are nearly identical to those 
without using a security protocol considering that the 
overhead resulting from clustering and establishing the keys 
are neglected which will only be done once upon 
deployment. With fewer senders, channel contention is less 
of an issue, so the packet length overhead does not affect the 
throughput. Comparing with TinyPK, the resulting 
bandwidth is better in SHESP due to the resulting overhead 
encountered in using TinyPK. 
 
 
Fig 2.  Total energy expenditure in the network relative to spatial 
separation between the source and target nodes.  
 
Fig 3.  Total delay incurred between sending and receiving at the 
target node relative to the spatial separation between source and 
target nodes.  
 
Fig 4.  Bandwidth as a function of send-receive pairs 
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Fig 5. Total energy and delay incurred due to establishing the 
symmetric key in a single node in the network (in SHESP and 
TinyPK). The results are an average of 5 simulation runs. 
 Both SHESP and TinyPK undergo a key establishment 
phase during the initial network deployment, where each 
node is given a symmetric key to share either with its 
clusterhead (in SHESP) or the External Party (in TinyPK). 
We present in Fig. 5 the energy and time consumed to 
establish the symmetric key in a single node in the network. 
Here, we notice the difference between our protocol and 
TinyPK: SHESP shows dramatic savings both in energy 
consumption and time. This is mostly due to the adopted 
asymmetric algorithm in our protocol, where Elliptic Curve 
has been proven to be superior to RSA (algorithm used in 
TinyPK), in both computation time and energy.  
 TinyPK establishes node-to-node communication by 
routing the packet through the External Party, which 
introduces unnecessary delay when the communicating 
nodes are in the same vicinity. An important primitive in 
securing sensor networks is data integrity, which ensures 
that data has not been tampered with. Security practices 
have shown that using encryption without authentication is 
insecure [2]. SHESP provides high data integrity in all cases 
and for all packets in transit. However, TinyPK does not 
ensure data integrity in packets sent from node to node 
(through the EP), nor in packets from a node to the EP 
informing it of the symmetric key to be established, since it 
does not enforce the use of any authentication code. Thus, 
the symmetric key can be easily altered by an attacker, and 
the symmetric keys maintained at the node and the EP 
would no longer match. This would impose time delays and 
energy waste before the error can be caught, and the node 
would have to send the packet all over again to the EP 
which is always exposed to the same attack. The only packet 
by which TinyPK includes a MAC to enforce data integrity 
is when the EP sends a node its public key. This clearly 
violates what most papers in the field of security argue as 
the most important primitive in sensor networks. SHESP 
provides data authenticity (ensuring secure source) by 
applying a MAC on the packet before encryption, making it 
more efficient. However, the current implementation of 
TinyPK does not ensure data authenticity. 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
The protocol proposed in this paper provides the ability to 
employ the benefits of both symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptographic operations to establish an acceptable level of 
security in wireless sensor networks. The main purpose was 
to make use of public key cryptography to put in place a 
secure symmetric exchange of data, thus providing security 
at a reasonable cost. The division of the network into 
clusters is also essential in making the protocol more 
energy-efficient, more scalable, and more resilient to 
attacks. 
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